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INDEPENDENT INTERPRETATION:
CALIFORNIA'S DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
OR DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE?
The Burger Court makes life difficult for state judges be-
cause it challenges them to make federalism more than a
cliche for judicial conservatism and states' rights more
than a slogan for obstructionism.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The term "states' rights" usually conjures up images of
strict constructionist judicial interpretations and separatist
movements aimed at retaining the status quo in the face of
change. Ironically, a modern version of states' rights, some-
times called the "new federalism,"' urges state courts to en-
gage in judicial activism in order to develop a body of state
constitutional law for the protection and amplification of civil
liberties.'
In the recent history of our nation, the federal govern-
ment has dominated the expansion of individual rights, some-
times through legislation but more often by way of judicial
activism.4 The United States Supreme Court under Chief Jus-
tice Earl Warren is generally credited (or criticized) for cen-
0 1981 by Betty Ann Smith.
1. Project Report, Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. REv. 271, 275 (1973).
2. See Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Eva-
sion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974); Wilkes, More on the New Federal-
ism in Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky. L.J. 873 (1975); Note, The New Federalism: To-
ward a Principled Interpretation of the State Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REv. 297
(1977) [hereinafter cited as New Federalism].
3. See, e.g., Countryman, Why a State Bill of Rights?, 45 WASH. L. REv. 454
(1970); Daughtrey, State Court Activism and Other Symptoms of the New Federal-
ism, 45 TENN. L. REV. 731 (1978); Falk, Foreward: The State Constitution: A More
than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 273 (1973); Linde, Without
"Due Process", Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REv. 125 (1970); Tone,
The Federal Constitution in the State Courts: The Increasing Responsibilities of
State Judges, JUDGES' J., Winter 1977, at 2; Project Report, supra note 1; Note,
Rediscovering the California Declaration of Rights, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 481 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Declaration of Rights]; New Federalism, supra note 2. But see
Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State Ground, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 750 (1972).
4. Falk, supra note 3, at 273. See also Project Report, supra note 1, at 275-84.
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tralization of the protection of individual liberties. A substan-
tial change in Supreme Court personnel during the late 1960's
and early 1970's, however, has resulted in a curtailment of in-
dividual rights in some areas5 and retardation of the growth of
protection in others.'
In order to retain the vitality of the Bill of Rights in an
era of increasing governmental encroachment on personal lib-
erties, some state courts are beginning to employ the doctrine
of independent interpretation.7 As its name implies, this doc-
trine basically incorporates two elements. The first element is
independence: the state court will look first to state law as the
basis for its constitutional analysis before reaching federal is-
sues.8 The second element is interpretation: the state courtjudges will reach principled decisions through their own
thought processes and will adopt another court's analysis only
if its reasoning is persuasive.9
The foundation of independent interpretation regarding
civil liberties lies in the "double security" of having both fed-
eral and state bills of rights. 10 Upholding the state side of this
5. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (federal constitution does not
require that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on grounds that
evidence obtained in violation of search and seizure was introduced at trial); Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (statements seized in violation of Miranda warnings
may be used to impeach defendant's credibility). See also Howard, State Courts and
Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873 (1976)
Declaration of Rights, supra note 3, at 510-11 n.171.
6. Howard, supra note 5, at 874-75; Project Report, supra note 1, at 273-74. See
Society of American Law Teachers, Statement of the Board of Governors Oct. 10,
1976, for a summary of Burger Court opinions. See generally Cox, Federalism and
Individual Rights Under the Burger Court, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1978):
[T]he Justices appointed since 1968 have manifested in varying degrees
and a variety of contexts, a deep concern about the expansion of consti-
tutional law during the 1960s-about too much law, about the trivial-
izing of constitutional safeguards, about interfering with state autonomy
and responsibility, and about the effects, in the final analysis, of overac-
tivism upon the legitimacy of the Court's decision.
Id. at 7.
7. Mosk, Contemporary Federalism, 9 PAC. L.J. 711 (1978) (adapted from an
address delivered at New York University Bicentennial Conference, April 28, 1976,
published in American Law: The Third Century). Justice Mosk notes that eighteen
state courts are basing liberty decisions on their own state constitutions. Id. at 718.
8. Linde, supra note 3, at 133-34. Professor (now Oregon Supreme Court Jus-
tice) Linde argues that there can be no final state action for fourteenth amendment
purposes until the highest state court has applied state law to the issues at hand.
9. See Falk, supra note 3, at 282.
10. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (Modern Library ed. 1937) (A. Hamilton or J.
Madison).
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protection, the California Supreme Court has been recognized
as the "pre-eminent state forum in the bill of rights area."" A
pioneer in independent interpretation, 2 many of the court's
better known decisions involve the rights of criminal defen-
dants and equal protection challenges."
This comment focuses upon the California court in a
fledgling and perhaps precarious area for independent inter-
pretation where rights of free expression and petition are pit-
ted against private property rights. The first section of the
comment sketches the background of independent interpreta-
tion. The second section explores the evolution of this doc-
trine through an analysis of California Supreme Court cases
where rights of free speech conflicted with private property
rights. The final section suggests that the manner of indepen-
dent interpretation employed by the California Supreme
Court in a recent rights conflict case amounts to a judicial
declaration of independence from the United States Supreme
Court founded upon a revived sense of federalism.
II. INDEPENDENT INTERPRETATION-BACKGROUND
Two parallel charters each purporting to guarantee fun-
damental rights to the same group of individuals consti-
tutes an embarassment of riches.14
Having two constitutions to protect basic individual
rights from governmental infringement may seem legally re-
dundant. During the federal constitutional debates, however,
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the
people is first divided between two distinct governments; and then the
portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate depart-
ments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The
different governments will control each other, at the same time each will
be controlled by itself.
Id. at 339.
11. Project Report, supra note 1, at 326; Falk, supra note 3, at 280.
12. See, e.g., People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955) (six years
before the exclusionary rule was adopted by the United States Supreme Court, the
California Supreme Court held that evidence seized in violation of the California con-
stitutional prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure will be excluded at
trial); People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955) (allows vicarious use of
exclusionary rule which is still not required under the federal constitution).
13. See Falk, supra note 3, at 277-79 nn.16-18 for an exhaustive list of pre-1973
California Supreme Court opinions based in whole or in part on the California
Constitution.
14. Project Report, supra note 1, at 275.
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James Madison led the movement to retain both documents
as restrictions upon each government's separate functions.1"
After all, the United States Constitution carved the powers of
the federal government out of what had previously been state
powers.' At our nation's inception the lines drawn were very
clear: the United States Constitution provided only a limited
role for the central government and left the remaining govern-
mental functions to the states. The states were, therefore, the
original and primary protectors of civil liberties under the fed-
eral system. 17 The restrictions on governmental authority ex-
pressed in the Bill of Rights applied only to federal govern-
ment activities."8 The original states already had their own
bills of rights to protect their citizens against state govern-
mental intrusions on individual liberties. Thus, the two sepa-
rate charters operated independently for nearly 80 years from
the beginning of the federation until the Civil War.
After the Civil War, however, a combination of nationalis-
tic spirit and distrust of the minimal protection of civil liber-
ties provided by the states caused the passage of the thir-
teenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments'" to the
15. Id. at 276.
16. See generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CONSTITUTION 01 THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 92-82, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. XVIII (1972) noting that federalism includes the following elements:
(1) as in all federations, the union of several autonomous political enti-
ties, or "States," for common purposes; (2) the division of legislative
powers between a "National Government," on the one hand, and con-
stituent "States," on the other, which division is governed by the rule
that the former is "a government of enumerated powers" while the lat-
ter are governments of "residual powers"; (3) the direct operation, for
the most part, of each of these centers of government, within its as-
signed sphere, upon all persons and property within its territorial limits;
(4) the provision of each center with the complete apparatus of law en-
forcement, both executive and judicial; (5) the supremacy of the "Na-
tional Government" within its assigned sphere over any conflicting as-
sertion of "State" power; (6) dual citizenship.
See generally Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States, in THE GREAT RIGHTS (E.
Cahn ed. 1963).
17. See People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 550, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 315, 329 (1975); Mosk supra note 7, at 712; Project Report, supra note 1, at
275-79.
18. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII provides in pertinent part:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in pertinent part:
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Constitution. These amendments applied to the states as well
as to the federal government and gave rise to nationwide ap-
plication of certain narrowly defined fundamental rights for
all citizens.2 0 A rapidly changing society and continued poor
performance by state courts in the protection of civil liber-
ties' led the United States Supreme Court to apply parts of
the federal Bill of Rights to the states through the proscrip-
tions of the fourteenth amendment.2 2 Eventually, this "selec-
tive incorporation" of the Bill of Rights28 led to federal domi-
nance in the protection of individual rights.24
This history of increasing federal expansion of individual
liberties against the power of both governments left little
room for independent interpretation of state bills of rights. As
long as the Supreme Court was aggressive in protecting civil
liberties, state courts found it unnecessary to risk making ex-
pansive decisions on their own-they simply deferred to the
High Court and adopted the federal precedent. 25 With the un-
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XV provides in pertinent part:
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude.
20. Project Report, supra note 1, at 279-83.
21. See Lay, States' Rights: The Emergence of a New Judicial Perspective, 22
S.D. L. REV. 1, 2 (1977); Paulsen, State Constitutions, State Courts and First
Amendment Freedoms, 4 VAND. L. REV. 620 (1951). An early critic of state court
deference to federal reasoning, Paulsen stated: "Although state constitutions contain
full statements of our civil liberties, on the whole the record of state court guardian-
ship of 'First Amendment Freedoms' is disappointing. Only occasionally do state
cases. . . take a position protecting the freedoms beyond what has been required by
the United States Supreme Court." Id. at 642. See generally Shuford, Federal En-
croachment on States' Rights, 45 A.B.A.J. 1042 (1959).
22. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REv. 489, 493-95 (1977); Project Report, supra note 1, at 282-83. See
generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 476-501 (10th
ed. 1980). The due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment
together with the prohibition on state action have been held to require nationwide
protection of certain fundamental rights from abridgement by either state or federal
government.
23. For a discussion of the theories of "absorption" of the Bill of Rights into the
fourteenth amendment in the criminal area see Y. KAMISAR, W. LEFAVE, J. ISRAEL,
BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 19-30 (4th ed. 1974).
24. Project Report, supra note 1, at 283-84.
25. Falk, supra note 3, at 273; Howard, supra note 5, at 878; Mosk, supra note
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certain implications for individual rights that accompanied
the drastic changes in Court membership that occurred in the
early 1970's, commentators began urging state courts to fulfill
their judicial duties by developing independent interpreta-
tions of their own state constitutions.
The theory underlying independent interpretation is as
old as the federal government itself. Early cases established
the principle that the Supreme Court does not have jurisdic-
tion to review state decisions that are based on adequate and
independent state grounds.' This principle adds particular
significance to the doctrine of independent interpretation
since a solid state basis for decision may fulfill the "adequate"
and "independent" requirements, even when a federal ques-
tion is involved. s
7, at 713-15; New Federalism, supra note 2, at 299 n.13. See also CAL. CONST. REVI-
SION COMM'N, ART. I, DECL. OF RIGHTS-BACKGROUND STUDY #3 (1969) which noted
that federal law had so pervaded the area of free speech and press rights that little
state law was in existence at that time. Id. at 16-17. The Commission went on at page
31 of the report to inform the Legislature that ". . . virtually any activity falling
short of substantial impairment of private property rights or public convenience will
be protected by the First Amendment." (emphasis added).
26. Linde, supra note 3; Project Report, supra note 1; New Federalism, supra
note 2, at 297.
27. Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Rd. Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487, 491-92 (1965); Herb v.
Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-28 (1945); Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210-11
(1935); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 635 (1875). 28 U.S.C. §
1257 (1976) provides:
Final judgments of decrees rendered by the highest court of a State
in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court as follows:
1) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or
statute of the United States and the decision is against its validity.
3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of a treaty or statute of
the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a State
statute is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the
Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, or where any title,
right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the
Constitution, treaties or statutes of, or commission held or authority ex-
ercised under, the United States.
See also C. WRIGHT, WRIGHT ON FEDERAL COURTS § 107 (1963).
28. See Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Rd. Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487 (1965), where the
Supreme Court acknowledged that "[e]ven though a state court's opinion relies on
similar provisions in both the State and Federal Constitutions, the state constitu-
tional provision has been held to provide an independent and adequate ground of
decision, depriving this court of jurisdiction to review the state judgment." Id. at 491-
92. See also Daughtrey, supra note 3, at 736; Howard, supra note 5, at 876.
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A. Right- Versus-Government
It is well settled that states may allow their citizens indi-
vidual liberties that are more expansive than the minimum
guarantees required by the federal constitution as interpreted
by the United States Supreme Court.29 This theory produces
few problems in areas where individual civil liberties conflict
with governmental powers to regulate-a "right-versus-gov-
ernment" situation.30 In this context, a decision to expand the
rights of the individual merely diminishes the powers of the
state and has no effect upon federal powers."1 Where an indi-
vidual right conflicts with governmental power, the judicial in-
quiry usually consists of defining the scope of the right, deter-
mining whether the government can regulate the individual's
activity, deciding which government has the power to do so,
and then ascertaining whether the government has acted
within its powers.3 2 If it is the state government that has the
power to regulate the activity, the state court is free to in-
crease the individual right beyond the federal minimum level.
A decision based upon independent interpretation in the
right-versus-government situation is usually insulated from
United States Supreme Court review."8
29. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175 (1969); Cooper v. California,
386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733 (1966).
30. The term right-versus-government will be used throughout this comment to
indicate an individual right in opposition to the government acting in its participant
capacity. In this role, the government interacts directly with the individual; the ex-
pansion of an individual right causes a corresponding restriction on government pow-
ers and vice versa.
31. But see People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 277, 545 P.2d 1333, 1341, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 629, 637 (1976) (Clark, J. dissenting); People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 118,
545 P.2d 272, 283, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 371 (1976) (Richardson, J., dissenting); People
v. Norman, 14 Cal. 3d 929, 940, 538 P.2d 237, 245, 123 Cal. Rptr. 109, 117 (1975)
(Richardson, J., dissenting); People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 553, 531 P.2d 1099,
1115, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 331 (1975) (Burke, J., dissenting).
32. The area of criminal procedure provides good examples of the right-versus-
government analysis. See note 12 supra.
33. But see California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971) (vacating and remanding a
state court holding of a violation of the fifth amendment right against self-incrimina-
tion); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (vacating and remanding a state court
holding of a violation of the sixth amendment confrontation clause). See also How-
ard, supra note 5, at 875 suggesting that the Supreme Court will not allow expansion
of individual rights in the criminal context if based on federal constitutional law and
where the Court itself has refused expansion.
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B. Right- Versus-Right
A more delicate issue arises, however, when two individ-
ual rights protected by both constitutions collide-a "right-
versus-right" situation.3 4 Here, the government sits in its refe-
ree capacity and balances the strength of the conflicting
rights.3 5 The government's only interest is in fairness; govern-
mental powers are not diminished by striking any particular
balance.
Where an individual seeks governmental enforcement of a
personal right that would infringe upon the rights of another
individual, independent interpretation becomes more com-
plex. State courts are not free to expand certain rights at the
expense of countervailing minimum rights guaranteed by the
federal constitution. 0 The validity of independent interpreta-
tion in the right-versus-right context depends upon whether a
federally protected minimum guarantee has been established
and whether the state is precluded from impinging upon that
right in all circumstances. 37 Thus, when two rights are in the
balance, United States Supreme Court review cannot always
be avoided because no matter how independent the state legal
foundation may be, it may still be inadequate. 8
Although the California Supreme Court has relied for a
number of years upon the state Declaration of Rights to ex-
pand individual liberties in the right-versus-government set-
ting, the right-versus-right conflict presents a new and less se-
cure decisional situation. State courts are required to use
particularly creative analyses to either protect their decisions
from federal review or to attempt to persuade the United
States Supreme Court that greater individual liberties are
necessary and workable.
34. The term right-versus-right will be used throughout this comment to indi-
cate the government acting in its referee capacity.
35. See generally Cox, supra note 6, at 24, discussing the Supreme Court as an
"umpire" between federal and state governmental conflicts. See also Sax, Takings
and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964) for a discussion of the two governmen-
tal roles in an economic context.
36. See Falk, supra note 3, at 280 n.29; Project Report, supra note 1, 315 n.241;
New Federalism, supra note 2, at 317 n.142.
37. Project Report, supra note 1, at 312-15. The Report stresses that the state
court's willingness to found its decision on state law regardless of the correctness of
its federal law decision is the critical factor in independent interpretation.
38. Id. at 315. The Project Report points out that a state decision that would
bar consideration of important federal interests would be inadequate.
[Vol. 21
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This conflict of rights problem was faced by the Califor-
nia court in a series of three cases 9 spanning nine years which
involved the issue of whether shopping center owners may en-
tirely prohibit expressive activities and petitioning on pri-
vately owned commercial premises. The history of the Califor-
nia analysis exhibits dramatic changes in the court's
perception of the role of state courts, state law, and the use of
the independent interpretation doctrine.
III. EVOLUTION OF INDEPENDENT INTERPRETATION IN THE
RIGHT-VERSUS-RIGHT CONTENT
The California Constitution is, and always has been, a
document of independent force.40
Independent interpretation by the California Supreme
Court in the right-versus-right context began rather tenuously
as makeweight support for a largely traditional federal analy-
sis. In the first case, Diamond v. Bland (Diamond I), the court
took a novel question, appraised federal precedent, and but-
tressed its decision with state case law.41 The California Con-
stitution was not mentioned. A few years later, with the ad-
vent of a contrary Supreme Court holding on the same
subject, the court retreated from its initial stance and de-
ferred to the Court in Diamond v. Bland (Diamond II), but
not without a vocal minority statement on its "surrender.' '42
The latest California decision involving a right-versus-right
conflict marks a notable extension of independent interpreta-
tion based solely upon the California Declaration of Rights.48
A. Diamond I-Prophecy
In 1970, a constitutional issue of first impression came
39. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153
Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Diamond v. Bland, 11 Cal. 3d 331, 521
P.2d 460, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1974); Diamond v. Bland, 3 Cal. 3d 653, 477 P.2d 733,
91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971).
40. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 548, 549-50, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 315, 329 (1975).
41. 3 Cal. 3d 653, 477 P.2d 733, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
988 (1971).
42. 11 Cal. 3d 331, 336, 521 P.2d 460, 466, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468, 474 (1974) (Mosk,
J., dissenting).
43. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153
Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), afl'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
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before the California Supreme Court in Diamond L The
plaintiffs in that case asserted that their first and fourteenth
amendment rights were violated by shopping center owners
who denied them access to solicit signatures for two initiative
petitions. The plaintiffs had conducted their activities without
permission until they were ordered to leave the premises.
They later sought declaratory relief and an injunction against
the shopping center's owners."
Because the United States Supreme Court had not
squarely faced this question in previous cases, the California
Supreme Court sought to reach a principled decision by en-
gaging in traditional constitutional analysis modeled on
United States Supreme Court methods. This type of analysis
commonly thrusts a state court into a prophecy role." The
California court first looked to Supreme Court precedent,
then to lower federal court precedent, and finally to state case
law. Even though the California Declaration of Rights also
protects free speech, petition, and private property, the court
never examined those provisions in reaching its decision.
Presuming that the plaintiffs' expressive activity was
within the ambit of the first amendment," the court first
looked to federal case law to discern guidelines set by the
United States Supreme Court that might help resolve the con-
troversy. At that time, only two Supreme Court cases had di-
rectly dealt with the conflict between private commercial
property interests and free speech rights.
One of these cases, Marsh v. Alabama,7 involved the
company town of Chickasaw, Alabama, which had prohibited
the dissemination of religious literature on its privately owned
streets. Since the federal Bill of Rights applies only to govern-
mental actions and the first amendment can be applied to the
states only through the fourteenth amendment, the Court had
to find state action if it was to prohibit the town's denial of
the plaintiff's expressive activities. In a frequently quoted
44. 3 Cal. 3d at 656-57, 477 P.2d at 734-35, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 502-03.
45. Linde, supra note 3, at 160.
46. The California court relied on Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley
Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 313, 315 (1968) (see text accompanying notes 47-51 infra)
and Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939). See also Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450
(1938) (freedom of the press extends to every sort of publication of information or
opinion including- handbills); United States v. Cruickshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876)
(protecting right to petition as essential attribute of government).
47. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
[Vol. 21
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opinion by Justice Black,48 the Court held that the state ac-
tion requirement was satisfied in some circumstances where
private property could be treated as public property for first
amendment purposes. Thus, the state could not allow the
property owner to use state trespass laws to restrain funda-
mental federally guaranteed liberties of free expression.
The second federal case was newer and more directly on
point because it concerned labor picketing at a shopping
center. Two years before Diamond I, the Court in Food Em-
ployees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc."' had invali-
dated the total prohibition of picketing on shopping center
premises by applying the principles of Marsh. Justice Mar-
shall's Logan Valley opinion is probably best remembered for
its articulation of the theory of functional equivalency which
the Diamond I majority found convincing.50 "The similarities
between the business block in Marsh and the shopping center
in the present case are striking. . . . The shopping center is
clearly the functional equivalent of the business district in
Chickasaw involved in Marsh."' 1
The California court took its cue for the appropriate rea-
soning from the combination of these two cases. Both Marsh
and Logan Valley had expanded the concept of "state action"
to include quasi-public property. At that time the Supreme
Court apparently was looking for private property that had
assumed significant public functions. When such quasi-public
property was identified, a different standard was applied to
determine the parameters of free exercise of first amendment
rights than would be applied to expressive activity on wholly
private property. If the property was wholly private, the Bill
of Rights did not apply; but if the property was quasi-public,
48. Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an
owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in
general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory
and constitutional rights of those who use it. . . . Whether a corpora-
tion or municipality owns or possesses the town the public in either case
has an identical interest in the functioning of the community in such a
manner that the channels of communication remain free ...
Id. at 506-07.
49. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
50. The theory of functional equivalency declared that some private property
became quasi-public when the owners assumed significant public functions normally
provided by the government. The term "quasi-public" will be used throughout this
comment to indicate privately owned commercial shopping center property.
51. 391 U.S. at 317-18.
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the private actions of the owner were deemed equivalent to
state action, thus triggering application of the first
amendment.
Logan Valley specifically reserved the question now fac-
ing the California court-whether non-business-related ex-
pression should be permitted on shopping center property.52
The extension of United States Supreme Court reasoning,
however, led inevitably to the conclusion reached by the Dia-
mond I majority. Although noting that Logan Valley had
been limited to its facts, the California court found its reason-
ing "persuasive authority" for protection of first amendment
rights on privately owned shopping center property."
To round out the traditional federal law analysis, the Di-
amond I court cited a recent Oregon federal district court case
that supported the extension of quasi-public status to shop-
ping centers. Tanner v. Lloyd Corp.," which had facts nearly
identical to those before the Diamond I court, also relied on
both Marsh and Logan Valley in reaching a result similar to
that in Diamond I.
This familiar approach to novel questions in liberty areas
forced the state court to act much like a prophet-culling an
analytical framework from the Logan Valley decision, project-
ing it into a new but similar fact situation, and attempting to
divine what the Supreme Court might hold on the same
question.
Whereas many state courts would have stopped at this
point, the California Supreme Court went one step further
and bolstered its reasoning by turning to its own state law
precedent, which conceivably provided independent and ade-
quate state grounds as a basis for the decision.
1. State Case Law
Although the Diamond I majority regarded the federal
cases as compelling, they found further support in the reason-
ing of state cases which provided "additional instructive pre-
cedent." 55 The court used the cases to illustrate California's
own special adherence to the notion of functional equivalency
52. Id. at 320 n.9.
53. 3 Cal. 3d at 659, 447 P.2d at 737, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
54. 308 F. Supp. 128 (D. Or. 1970), rev'd, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
55. 3 Cal. 3d at 661, 477 P.2d at 738, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
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and to reject two standards proposed by the defendants for
judging when expressive activities could be prohibited.
A few months before the Diamond I decision, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court used the theory of functional equivalency
to resolve a different right-versus-right conflict. In deciding In
re Cox,5a the California court noted that shopping centers
served an important public function and substituted as a town
center in suburban areas. With this quasi-public status, the
property owner was not allowed to arbitrarily refuse admis-
sion to the shopping center on the basis of race, politics, or
dress. 5 7 For purposes of analysis, this line of reasoning was in
accord with the United States Supreme Court's position in
Logan Valley.
Analogies concerning the quasi-public designation of
shopping centers were also drawn from labor picketing cases.
Schwartz-Torrance Investment Corp. v. Bakery & Confec-
tionary Workers' Union Local 315s was the California fact
counterpart of Logan Valley. Preceding Logan Valley by four
years, Schwartz-Torrance held that the owner of a shopping
center could not enjoin peaceful labor picketing on an em-
ployer's leased premises as a trespass. Furthermore, a 1969
California decision, In re Lane,59 extended protection of
peaceful union picketing and handbilling to include privately
owned sidewalks in front of business premises. The Diamond
I court noted that in both of the earlier cases it had employed
a balancing test and had found that unobstructive first
amendment expression outweighed the owner's rights in
quasi-public property.
The court in Diamond I also expressly rejected two tests
proposed by defendants to determine the permissibility of ex-
pressive activities on private commercial property. The first
test defendants proposed would have required that the ex-
pressive activity be directly related to the normal business of
56. 3 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970). The case involved a
challenge to a shopping center's policy of refusing admittance to males having long
hair and to persons in unconventional dress.
57. "In undertaking to provide the necessities of life, the shopping center per-
forms an important public function. . . . Our modern society has become so interde-
pendent and interrelated that those who perform a significant public function may
not erect barriers of arbitrary discrimination in the marketplace." Id. at 218, 474 P.2d
at 1000, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
58. 61 Cal. 2d 766, 394 P.2d 921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1964).
59. 71 Cal. 2d 872, 457 P.2d 561, 79 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1969).
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the shopping center. Although the state cases relied upon by
the court had met this requirement, the petitioning activities
involved in Diamond I did not. Despite that distinction, the
court found that the difference was relevant only as one factor
in determining the strength of the first amendment claim re-
garding the location of the activity and, thus, was noc
conclusive.60
The court similarly rejected the availability of alternative
sites for expression as a conclusive test of the permissibility of
such activities at shopping centers. In doing so, the court
made it clear that since the shopping center was the "most
effective" location for petitioning, those activities were pro-
tected even if other sites might also be effective.2 Addition-
ally, the "available alternative" test had already been rejected
as a limit on first amendment activities on private commercial
property in a 1967 state decision.2
Balancing the first amendment and property interests at
stake, the Diamond I court found the owner's property inter-
est was diminished by the open invitation for public usage.6
When weighed against the "preferred" right of free speech,
the property interest in "bare title" could not command a
right to absolute control but only allowed the owner to exer-
cise reasonable regulation of expressive activities. 4
2. Traditional Analysis
In Diamond I, Justice Mosk crafted a careful opinion that
drew six out of seven votes from the court. Since the court
was in the uncertain position of interpreting important indi-
vidual rights without Supreme Court guidance, as it fre-
60. 3 Cal. 3d at 662, 477 P.2d at 738, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
61. Id.
62. In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 852 n.7, 434 P.2d 353, 357 n.7, 64 Cal. Rptr.
97, 101 n.7 (1967) (held a privately owned railway could not absolutely prohibit ex-
pressive activities on private property held open for public use). In this opinion, Chief
Justice Traynor developed an "interference" test for determining when owners who
held their property open for public use could prohibit first amendment activities. Id.
at 851, 434 P.2d at 356, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
63. 3 Cal. 3d at 662-63, 477 P.2d at 739, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
64. The court held: "Unless there is obstruction of or undue interference with
normal business operations, the bare title of the property owners does not outweigh
the substantial interest of individuals and groups to engage in peaceful and orderly
First Amendment activities on the premises of shopping centers open to the public."
Id. at 666, 477 P.2d at 741, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 509.
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quently will be, its extrapolation of the reasoning of federal
and state opinions to a new fact situation served as a sound
method of analysis. The Marsh company town of 1946 might
no longer exist but the 1968 shopping center was similar
enough to justify application of the same rationale in a mod-
ern context. That rationale took into account the inevitable
changes in society. Thus, it appeared the United States Su-
preme Court and the California Supreme Court were in agree-
ment concerning this rights conflict and that the latter's
prophecy was legitimate.
Nonetheless, several potential weaknesses lurked in the
decision. The word "constitution" was used without reference
to whether the federal or state constitution was being relied
upon." The failure to distinguish the two constitutions
tended to support a reading of Diamond I that assumed coex-
tensive rights protection. Furthermore, the labeling of the ex-
pressive rights in federal terms of first and fourteenth amend-
ments left unclear how much reliance had been placed on
state law in reaching the decision. Thus, even though Dia-
mond I was denied certiorari four times," the arguable federal
basis of the decision came back to haunt the court four years
later.
B. Diamond Il-Retreat
In 1974, the Diamond v. Bland controversy returned to
the California Supreme Court for review as Diamond II. Two
years earlier, the United States Supreme Court had reversed
the Tanner v. Lloyd Corp.67 decision that the Diamond I
court had cited with approval. A California trial court dis-
solved the injunction against the shopping center relying on
the United States Supreme Court's reversal of Lloyd. When
65. Justice Mosk stated in his Diamond II dissent: "I can understand how typi-
cal is the majority's dereliction in the area of state constitutional rights. Unfortu-
nately few state courts steadfastly protect their own state constitutional guaran-
tees. . . ." 11 Cal. 3d at 337, 521 P.2d at 464, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
66. 402 U.S. 988 (1971) (cert. denied) (Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J., of the
opinion certiorari should be granted); 404 U.S. 874 (1971) (rehearing denied); 405
U.S. 981 (1972) (rehearing denied) (Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J., of the opinion
rehearing should be granted); 409 U.S. 897 (1972) (motion for leave to file third peti-
tion for rehearing denied) (Blackmun, J., would call for response pursuant to Rule
58(3)).
67. 308 F. Supp. 128 (D. Or. 1970), rev'd, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). See text accom-
panying note 52 supra.
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Diamond If was appealed to the California Supreme Court,"
the court was confronted with the dilemma of whether to ac-
cede to the Supreme Court's analysis or to sustain its own
prior Diamond I analysis. The final vote of 4-3 to reverse Dia-
mond I was made over a spirited dissent by Justice Mosk that
urged the court to provide adequate state grounds for the
prior decision by independent interpretation of the California
Declaration of Rights."
1. The Majority Opinion
The Diamond II majority concluded that a reassessment
of Diamond I was required because the facts in Lloyd were
indistinguishable from those in the present case. Two rather
formidable problems faced the court in this endeavor. First,
determining the legal basis of its own prior holding, and sec-
ond, extracting the meaning of the Lloyd holding.
The court explained that its prior decision was based
"primarily" on federal law in Marsh and Logan Valley and
secondarily on state cases that had also been founded on
those same two federal cases."o Since both Marsh and Logan
Valley were eviscerated in Lloyd, 1 they presumably now had
little precedential value, which also served to dilute the force
of the state cases as precedent.
The bulk of the majority opinion outlined the United
States Supreme Court's analysis in Lloyd and applied it in
full to Diamond II. Much of this analysis directly conflicted
68. 11 Cal. 3d 331, 521 P.2d 460, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1974).
69. Id. at 335-46, 521 P.2d at 463-70, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 471-78.
70. Id. at 333-34, 521 P.2d at 462, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
71. See Henely, Property Rights and First Amendment Rights: Balance and
Conflict, 62 A.B.A.J. 77 (1976) (questioning Lloyd's requirement that expressive ac-
tivities relate to the business purpose as regulation based on content and therefore a
possible equal protection violation); Note, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner: The Demise of Lo-
gan Valley and the Disguise of Marsh, 61 Gzo. L.J. 1187 (1973); Note, Freedom of
Speech: Handbilling Unrelated to the Business Purpose of a Shopping Center Not
Protected by First Amendment, 19 N.Y.L.F. 174 (1973); Note, Lloyd Corp. v. Tan-
ner: Death of a Public Forum?, 7 U.S.F. L. Rim. 582 (1973) (suggesting use of inde-
pendent interpretation of the California Constitution as a basis for a different result);
Note, First Amendment Rights Versus Property Rights-The Death of the Func-
tional Equivalent, 27 U. MIAma L. Rav. 219 (1972) (assailing the vagueness of the
Lloyd tests); Young, A Change of View on the 1946 Marsh Doctrine, 58 A.B.A.J. 1307(1972) (suggesting Lloyd was based on a finding of no state action). Scores of case-
notes were written about the Lloyd case, primarily speculating on the basis for its
holding and its significance for first amendment rights.
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with the statements of the six member Diamond I majority
opinion. Three footnotes dealt with the major issues upon
which the two courts disagreed. The two tests that the Cali-
fornia court had expressly rejected-i) whether the expressive
activity relates to the purpose for which the shopping center
is being used, and 2) whether the speakers have adequate al-
ternatives for communication-had been adopted by the
United States Supreme Court to determine which speech ac-
tivities were constitutionally permissible. 72 The footnotes in
Diamond If pointed out that each of the tests had been dis-
cussed and were considered as factors in the Diamond I deci-
sion. What the footnotes did not mention, however, was that°
both tests had been discounted as not being determinative.
Nonetheless, the California court applied the tests to reverse
its previous decision.78
A third footnote set out the most significant difference in
the Supreme Court's interpretation.7 4 The Diamond II major-
ity noted that Lloyd specifically identified a property right of
federal constitutional dimensions. 5 Under this reasoning, the
Supremacy Clause of the federal constitution prevented state
grounds from defeating a federal constitutional claim. 7s
Thus, the majority did not apply the California Constitu-
tion, expressed no opinion as to whether it might afford more
protection to free speech than the federal constitution, and
explicitly said that it would make no difference in any event
due to the Supremacy Clause."
72. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 563-67 (1972).
73. 11 Cal. 3d at 334-35, 521 P.2d at 463, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
74. Id. at 335 n.4, 521 P.2d at 463 n.4, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 471 n.4.
75. Id. (citing Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. at 552-53).
76. The majority felt the Supremacy Clause precluded a contrary state holding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 provides:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
law of the land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding.
CAL. CONST. art. III, § 1 provides: "The State of California is an inseparablei part of
the United States of America, and the United States Constitution is the supreme law
of the land."
77. 11 Cal. 3d at 335 n.4, 521 P.2d at 463 n.4, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 471 n.4.
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2. The Dissent
Justice Mosk's dissent in Diamond II is a good example
of principled independent interpretation. The five parts of the
dissent elaborate theories of federalism with well-documented
support for a separate state interpretation in this area of
rights conflict. Justice Mosk chastised the majority for its
"surrender" and characterized the result as a "serious blow to
state sovereignty and to the independence which has previ-
ously been the hallmark of this court. '7 8 Only Justice Tobri-
ner joined Justice Mosk in scolding the majority, but Justice
Sullivan added a third vote for independent state constitu-
tional grounds as a possible basis for upholding the
injunction.7 '
The dissent argued that reliance on California constitu-
tional provisions was not only appropriate, but had been en-
couraged by the United States Supreme Court itself.80 Justice
Mosk adopted a notion of constitutional hierarchy advocated
by a well known commentator81 which stresses that state
courts should always assess state action in light of the state
78. Id. at 340, 521 P.2d at 466-67, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 474-75 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
79. Id. at 340-43, 521 P.2d at 467-68, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 475-76.
80. Id. at 339, 521 P.2d at 466, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 474 (citing Justice Powell's
discussion of the necessity for state constitutional interpretation in the federal system
in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) and Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356
(1972), and noting the Warren Court's commendation of California for its 1955 adop-
tion of the exclusionary rule).
81. Linde, supra note 3, at 131-35, 182-83.
The federal source of all "due process" and "equal protection" attacks
on state regulations is the fourteenth amendment command that "No
state shall.. . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." Whether this command has been violated
depends on what the state has finally done. Many low-level errors that
potentially deny due process or equal protection are corrected within
the state court system; that is what it is for. The state constitution is
part of the state law, and decisions applying it are part of the total state
action in a case ...
Id. at 133.
Judicial review of official action under the state constitution thus is logi-
cally prior to review of the effect of the state's total action (including
rejection of the state constitutional claim) under the fourteenth amend-
ment. Claims raised under the state constitution should always be
dealt with and disposed before reaching a fourteenth amendment claim
of deprivation of due process or equal protection.
Id. at 135 (emphasis in original).
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constitution before reaching any federal due process or equal
protection claims under the fourteenth amendment.
Justice Mosk rejected the premise that a single body of
constitutional law emanates from both state and federal
courts, finding California's Declaration of Rights "arguably
more embracive" than the federal Bill of Rights plus the four-
teenth amendment.82 Three sections of the California Consti-
tution s were deemed particularly important in deciding Dia-
mond II: the sections concerning free speech,8 petition, 85 and
privileges and immunities.86
The dissent traced the history of the California Constitu-
tion to show that it was not based on the federal constitution,
but instead was adapted from the constitutions of Iowa and
New York.87 Therefore, the dissent concluded, the safeguards
for basic rights contained in the California Constitution were
independent of the guarantees of the United States
Constitution.
Justice Mosk turned to independent interpretation in the
third part of his opinion. Here, his readings of both Diamond
I and Lloyd departed significantly from the majority's views.
82. 11 Cal. 3d at 337, 521 P.2d at 466, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 473.
83. The California constitutional provisions referred to in Diamond II were
from a pre-revision version.
84. Former CAL. CONST. art. I, § 9, revised CAL. CONST. art. I. § 2 provides in
pertinent part:
Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her senti-
ments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law
may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.
85. Former CAL. CONST. art. I, § 10 provided:
The people shall have the right to freely assemble together to con-
sult for the common good, to instruct their representatives, and to peti-
tion the Legislature for redress of grievances.
Revised CAL. CONST. art. I, § 3 provides in pertinent part:
The people have the right to instruct their representatives, petition
the government for redress of grievances, and assemble freely to consult
for the common good.
86. Former CAL. CONST. art. I, § 21 provided:
No special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which may
not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the Legislature; nor shall any
citizen, or class of citizens, be granted privileges or immunities which,
upon the same terms, shall not be granted to all citizens.
Revised CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7 provides in pertinent part-
(b) A citizen or class of citizens may not be granted privileges or
immunities not granted on the same terms to all citizens. Privileges or
immunities granted by the Legislature may be altered or revoked.
87. 11 Cal. 3d at 338, 521 P.2d at 465, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 473, (citing P. MASON,
CONSTITMONAL HisToRY oF CALiFoRNA 83 (1956)).
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The dissent read Diamond I as a decision based primarily on
state rather than federal case law. Justice Mosk saw in Dia-
mond I a test that balanced free speech interests against a
narrow property interest in exclusive possession. Furthermore,
the dissent refused to agree that the United States Supreme
Court had articulated a property right of constitutional stat-
ure in Lloyd.88 Justice Mosk reiterated that Lloyd was a first
amendment case restricted to its facts. He concluded that in
the absence of a federally created right to exclude others from
property, state case precedent and the California Constitution
would be controlling. These state grounds would be indepen-
dent and adequate and thus not subject to review.
Part IV of the dissent continued independent interpreta-
tion by analyzing the state constitutional protections afforded
the power of initiative"' and noted that "courts are zealous to
preserve its unfettered exercise 'to the fullest tenable measure
of spirit as well as letter.' ",i This argument was deemed com-
pelling by the three dissenting justices. Because the right to
petition is a "non-economic right rooted in the Constitu-
tion,"'91 it is essential to democracy. After recounting the pro-
cedures constitutionally required in California for submitting
an initiative petition, the dissent reiterated a longstanding
state policy favoring full exercise of the right of initiative. The
goal of this policy was to avoid giving effective political guar-
antees only to those wealthy enough to afford the means to
reach California voters for signature solicitation. The unique
character of petitioning provided a more traditional method
of sustaining Diamond I without the risk inherent in outright
disagreement with the United States Supreme Court.
Finally, in Part V, the dissent looked at potential harms
to the conflicting interests and attempted to factually distin-
guish Lloyd. Because Lloyd had considered the existence of
available alternative locations to be a major factor in deter-
mining permissible first amendment activity, the dissent
urged a distinction between handbilling and petitioning for an
88. 11 Cal. 3d at 340-41 n.1, 521 P.2d at 467 n.1, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 475 n.1.
89. This argument went outside the Declaration of Rights to the basic govern-
mental structure found in CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1, which provides in pertinent part:
"the people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative and referendum."
90. 11 Cal. 3d at 343, 521 P.2d at 468, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 476 (citing McFadden v.
Jordan, 32 Cal. 2d 330, 196 P.2d 787 (1948)).
91. Id. at 344, 521 P.2d at 469, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
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initiative measure. The Lloyd court had pointed out that the
leafletting could easily be accomplished on public streets or
sidewalks. The California dissenters stressed the impractica-
bility of this alternative for signature solicitation.
A second factual distinction between the two cases was
the difference in the practical effect of allowing ownership to
interfere with the expressive activity involved. Interfering
with leafletting might result in reduced circulation of the in-
formation. But allowing property owners to prohibit petition-
ing on private property held open to the public could well re-
sult in the failure of an initiative petition to qualify for the
ballot. By contrast, upholding the expressive activity under
reasonable regulations would have little effect on the property
owner's use of his commercial property.2 Since it was already
held open to the public, any rights to exclusive possession
were markedly diluted.
3. Analysis of the Retreat
Through the reasoning of the Diamond II dissent, the
seeds were sown for an independent interpretation of the Cal-
ifornia Declaration of Rights that would provide greater pro-
tection for free speech and the right to petition than that pro-
vided by the United States Constitution. Justice Mosk's
opinion outlined an approach to independent interpretation.
The approach involved several distinct steps that would
both exhibit the independence of the law and explain the
state rationale for its particular needs.98 Although Justice
Mosk did not discuss in detail the difference in the wording
between the federal and state bills of rights, the first step
looked at the language of the state constitutional provisions
guaranteeing individual rights. The second step reviewed the
history surrounding adoption of those provisions. Step three
identified the source of power for the state court to engage in
independent interpretation which was found implicitly in the
structure of the federal form of government and explicitly in
the opinions of the United States Supreme Court and the Cal-
92. Id. at 345, 521 P.2d at 470, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 478.
93. Several commentators have suggested approaches for state court indepen-
dent interpretation or for litigants preparing claims solely under state constitutions.
These analytical frameworks resemble Justice Moesk's Diamond II analysis. See Pro-
ject Report, supra note 1, at 315-19; Declaration of Rights, supra note 3, at 483-84;
New Federalism, supra note 2, at 316-19; Howard, supra note 5, at 935-40.
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ifornia Supreme Court. The fourth step distilled state policy
from the structure of the whole California Constitution, gaug-
ing the interrelationship of its parts and assessing their rela-
tive weight. Step five involved looking at unique local condi-
tions that required state rather than uniform federal
interpretation. Finally, step six distinguished federal prece-
dent on the facts and offered the United States Supreme
Court a way to defer to the state court's judgment. The result
was the assertion of an independent state interest in protect-
ing individual liberties to a degree beyond that prescribed by
the federal constitution. Nonetheless, a majority of the Dia-
mond I court was split as to whether it possessed the power
to independently interpret this issue under the California
Constitution.
Soon after Diamond II, the scales tipped in favor of inde-
pendent interpretation on the California court. In 1974, a re-
vision of the California Constitution containing some key pro-
visions was accepted by state voters at the polls." The
legislative study compiled to effect that revision supported the
state sovereignty movement advocated by proponents of inde-
pendent interpretation."5 Of particular importance was article
I, section 24, which declared that individual rights under the
California Constitution are independent of federal constitu-
tional guarantees."
Armed with this provision and the basic premise of feder-
94. The revised California Constitution was passed on the November 1974
ballot.
95. See CAL. CONST. REviSION COMM'N, Declaration of Rights, Background
Study #3 (1964) (quoting National Municipal League, Model State Constitution 27
(1968)).
Whether or not state constitutional protection of rights are greater than
their United States counterparts, it would be more in keeping with a
sound functioning of the federal system for the people to look first to
the state constitution and the state courts for the vindication of per-
sonal liberties that may be challenged by state law or state action.
Id. at 3.
96. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24 provides: "Rights guaranteed by this Constitution
are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution. This Dec-
laration of Rights may not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the
people."
See People v. Norman, 14 Cal. 3d 929,'939-40 n.10, 538 P.2d 237, 245 n.10, 123
Cal. Rptr. 109, 117 n.10 (1975) (dubbing section 24 a "declaration of constitutional
independence" reaffirming existing law). See also Howard, supra note 5, at 935-36
which suggests that section 24 is a constitutional invitation to independent state
interpretation.
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alism, the California Supreme Court declared its intention to
engage in independent interpretation in the case of People v.
Brisendine in 1975.97 In that case, the court faced a predica-
ment similar to that faced in Diamond II-whether to sustain
its own precedent or to accede to the United States Supreme
Court's reasoning upon the same issue." This time, however,
the California Court asserted a right to differ with the Su-
preme Court. Since that time, numerous California decisions
have been based solely on state grounds despite the occasion-
ally emphatic dissents of Justices Clark and Richardson" who
accuse the majority of using the doctrine to disagree with the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
In this setting, the particularly thorny question of the Di-
amond cases once again reared its ugly head in 1979 to split
the court on the issue of how to resolve conflicting individual
rights protected by both constitutions.
C. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center-Challenge
Rights of free speech and petition collided with private
property interests once again at the Pruneyard Shopping
Center when several high school students peacefully solicited
signatures for a petition. Their goal was to send a petition to
the White House opposing a United Nations' resolution
against Zionism. Security guards told the students to leave the
premises because they did not have permission to solicit. The
students left and later sought an injunction to prevent the
shopping center owners from denying them access. The trial
court refused to issue the injunction and Robins petitioned for
a hearing before the California Supreme Court.100
In a 4-3 decision, a majority of the California Suprenle
Court utilized independent interpretation to transmute the
97. 13 Cal. 3d 528, 548-52, 531 P.2d 1099, 1111-15, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 327-31
(1975) (holding that searches incident to arrest must be limited in scope to a legiti-
mate search for weapons and that other evidence seized without a warrant violates
California's constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure). Con-
tra, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
98. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
99. See note 31 supra.
100. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153
Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), afl'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). See Note, Constitutional Law-The
California Constitution Protects Rights of Free Speech and Petition, Reasonably
Exercised, in Privately Owned Shopping Centers, 20 SANTA CLARA L. Rv. 245
(1980).
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right-versus-right conflict into a right-versus-government res-
olution totally within the ambit of state control. The opinion
focused on two major issues: 1) whether Lloyd had created a
fifth amendment property right to prohibit speech and peti-
tion activities, and 2) if not, whether the California Constitu-
tion guarantees rights of free speech and petition at shopping
centers.101
In answering the first question, the majority challenged
the contention that Lloyd had given shopping center owners
federally protected fifth and fourteenth amendment property
rights that would allow them to deny access for free speech
and petition purposes. The majority dispelled the existence of
such a federal right by reading Lloyd narrowly, by supporting
that reading with several other Supreme Court shopping
center cases, and by overruling Diamond II. Having elimi-
nated the question of a federal minimum property right to ex-
clude, the court was free to find a greater degree of protection
for expressive activities in the California Constitution.
1. Has a Federal Minimum Right Been Established?
Justice Newman's majority opinion first analyzed whether
Lloyd had identified property rights of federal constitutional
magnitude via the fifth and fourteenth amendments.103 Al-
though Diamond II read Lloyd as saying exactly that, the
Robins court made a 180 degree turn and read Lloyd as "pri-
marily a first amendment case."108 The court summarily dis-
missed the claim that Lloyd defined special constitutional
property rights by characterizing the Supreme Court's discus-
sion of the fifth and fourteenth amendments as applying only
101. Justice Newman framed the issues in these terms:
(1) Did Lloyd v. Tanner Corp. [citation omitted] recognize federally pro-
tected property rights of such a nature that we now are barred from
ruling that the California Constitution creates broader speech rights as
to private property than does the federal Constitution. (2) If not, does
the California Constitution protect speech and petitioning at shopping
centers?
23 Cal. 3d at 903, 592 P.2d at 342, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
102. Id. at 904, 592 P.2d at 343, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
103. Id. The Lloyd holding stated: "We hold that there has been no such dedi-
cation of Lloyd's privately owned and operated shopping center to public use as to
entitle respondents to exercise their asserted First Amendment rights." 407 U.S. at
570.
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to an examination of state action requirements. 104 Basically,
the court glossed over the state action point in conclusory
fashion without an in-depth examination of the language of
the Lloyd opinion. 10 5
The court reinforced plaintiffs' position that no minimum
property right had been created by citing two subsequent fed-
eral cases concerning shopping centers. In Hudgens v.
NLRB,' 6e the United States Supreme Court found no first
amendment right to picket at a shopping center, but never-
theless recognized that private parties may be subject to stat-
utory or common law restrictions against the abridgement of
free expression of others.107 The Robins majority inferred that
the Supreme Court's recognition of the controlling nature of
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in Hudgens had
negated the idea that a constitutional "property right immune
from regulation" was created by Lloyd. Further strengthening
this line of reasoning, the Supreme Court's opinion in Eastex,
Inc. v. NLRB 0 8 deferred to the NLRA's statutory protections
of expressive activity while rejecting the dissent's argument
that a fifth amendment property right was violated.'0 9
Viewing Lloyd, Hudgens, and Eastex together, the Cali-
fornia court concluded that the property right at issue was not
absolutely protected but was instead an interest subject to
104. 23 Cal. 3d at 904, 592 P.2d at 343, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 856. For several years
after it was decided, the rather sticky issue of state action in the Lloyd case sparked
comment. See note 69 supra. One study targeted the state action area as a fertile
field for independent interpretation claiming that state laws can reach private con-
duct unless the state constitution specifically prohibits the action. Project Report,
supra note 1, at 297-301.
105. 23 Cal. 3d at 904, 592 P.2d at 343, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 856. State action is,a
threshold requirement before the United States Supreme Court can apply the first or
fifth amendments to the state. Both Marsh and Logan Valley had satisfied this re-
quirement by finding the property quasi-public under the functional equivalency the-
ory. Since Lloyd greatly restricted, if not eliminated that theory, the shopping center
property was apparently solely private property and the restriction of expressive ac-
tivities by the owners was private action. The Lloyd court did not make clear whether
it had found the requisite state action or whether the ultimate holding rested on a
finding of no state action.
106. 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (overruling Logan Valley).
107. Id. at 513.
108. 437 U.S. 556 (1978).
109. Justice Newman quoted language from a dissent by Justice Rehnquist,
joined by Chief Justice Burger, that asserted a federally protected fifth amendment
property right in the employer's premises. 23 Cal. 3d at 905, 592 P.2d at 344, 153 Cal.
Rptr. at 857 (quoting Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. at 574-83 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)).
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reasonable regulation by the government. Apparently, the ma-
jority felt that if Congress could regulate expressive activities
at shopping centers through the provisions of the NLRA, the
State of California could also regulate expressive activities at
shopping centers by way of its laws. Therefore, California was
not precluded by federal law from making laws in the public
interest that would require shopping center owners to permit
reasonably exercised first amendment activities on their
premises.110 "To hold otherwise would flout the whole devel-
opment of law regarding states' powers to regulate uses of
property and would place a state's interest in strengthening
first amendment rights in an inferior rather than a preferred
position." '
The court braced this line of reasoning with quotes from
old " ' and new state cases,118 with examples of numerous Cali-
fornia statutes enacted for the public welfare that validly re-
strict owner usage of private property,11 ' and with statistics
illustrating the increasing importance of shopping centers in
the modern life of California communities. 115 This supporting
material evidenced not only a longstanding history of state
regulation of private property in the public interest, but also a
continuing need for expansive regulatory practices responsive
to societal needs.
Whereas the majority denied the existence of either a fed-
eral or state constitutionally protected property right to to-
tally prohibit expressive activities, it did recognize a right to
petition protected by both constitutions. The right at stake
involved more than mere expression because the right to peti-
tion the government for redress is central to the California
form of government. 116 Comparing the right to petition with
other legitimate governmental goals like environmental and
aesthetic restrictions on the use of private property, the court
110. Id. at 905-06, 592 P.2d at 344, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
111. Id.
112. Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 488, 234 P. 381, 385 (1925).
113. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 392, 403,
546 P.2d 687, 697, 128 Cal. Rptr. 183, 190, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 802 (1976).
Although the court did not express the significance of the Supreme Court's dismissal,
presumably the majority felt a substantial federal question would have been present
if a fifth amendment property right had been established by Lloyd.
114. 23 Cal. 3d at 906, 592 P.2d at 344, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
115. Id. at 907, 592 P.2d at 345, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
116. Id. at 907-08, 592 P.2d at 345-46, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 858-59.
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concluded the state has the sovereign power to reasonably reg-
ulate private property to protect free speech and petition
through the provisions of the state constitution. 1 7
2. Effect of the California Constitution
The majority next turned to the issue of whether the Cal-
ifornia Constitution guarantees a right to petition at shopping
centers. While noting that no California statute required
shopping center owners to provide public forums, the court
relied upon the text of the California Constitution, '1 8 the his-
tory of its adoption, ' and state case law120 to illustrate that
California gives its citizens greater expressive rights than does
the federal constitution. This approach coincides with the se-
quence for independent interpretation suggested by several
commentators1 21 and with Justice Mosk's analysis in Diamond
II.
With the ghost of the Diamond cases waiting in the
wings, the majority reaffirmed its reasoning in Diamond I by a
detailed analysis of the same state cases that Diamond If had
treated as insubstantial precedent. At this point, the court
made its strongest statement in support of a state court's
right to engage in independent interpretation. First, it de-
clared that state cases that cited "federal law which subse-
quently took a divergent course"122 were still good state prece-
dent. Second, it noted parenthetically within the text of the
opinion that the California Constitution Revision Commission
had commented upon the instability of federal legal prece-
dents when it had proposed firmer state constitutional guar-
antees.12 s Third, it announced its independent duty as a state
117. Id. at 908, 592 P.2d at 346, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
118. See note 82 supra.
119. The opinion simply noted the wording of the two constitutions is different
and that California could have used the federal terminology if it had so desired.
120. The opinion cited Wilson v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 652, 532 P.2d 116,
119 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975), as an example of support for extra state protection of free
expression.
121. See note 91 supra.
122. 23 Cal. 3d at 908-09, 592 P.2d at 346, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
123. Several years later, Justice Moak addressed the dilemma posed by the in-
stability of federal opinions by stating:
In the final analysis, as the Supreme Court has careened from one
end of the constitutional spectrum to the other, state courts have two
alternatives. They can shift gears and once again change directions, thus
resuming the course upon which they had embarked in the pre-Warren
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court to determine the scope of rights in California, acknowl-
edging that "[f]ederal principles are relevant but not conclu-
sive so long as federal rights are protected. 1 24 Because the
court had already eliminated the idea of a federally protected
right, its only remaining duty was to ascertain California law
which did not require any use of federal reasoning.
The court admitted its misreading of Lloyd in Diamond
II, overruled that opinion, and concluded that the California
Constitution protects the reasonable exercise of speech and
petition in privately owned shopping centers.2 5 Thus, the
court came full circle, arriving at their original Diamond I de-
cision, but this time with a firmer state law basis.
3. The Dissent
Justice Richardson's dissenting opinion attacked the ma-
jority's limitation of property rights as a clear violation of the
federal constitution unsupported either by statute or case
precedent.1 26
More importantly, the dissent discounted the indepen-
dent interpretation of California's constitution, stressing that
denial of injunctive relief to Robins was compelled by both
Lloyd and Diamond II. The minority asserted that fundamen-
tal principles of federal supremacy prevented the court from
making a decision under the California Constitution that
would conflict with federal interpretations of the United
States Constitution.12 7 Emphatically, the dissent assailed the
narrow majority reading of Lloyd, citing passages from that
era. Or they can retain existing individual rights by reliance upon the
independent non-federal grounds found in the several state
constitutions.
Mosk, supra note 7, at 717-18.
124. 23 Cal. 3d at 909, 592 P.2d at 346, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 859. See Countryman,
supra note 3, at 462. Countryman asserts one advantage of state bills of rights is that
they may regulate private conduct, whereas federal regulation through the fourteenth
amendment requires state action.
125. 23 Cal. 3d at 910, 529 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860. See generally
Powell, The Relationship Between Property Rights and Civil Rights, 15 HASTINGS
L.J. 135 (1963) which years ago advocated the balancing of interests used by the ma-
jority in Robins and concluded that "[p]roperty rights cease when civil rights involv-
ing the public welfare are at stake." Id. at 150.
126. 23 Cal. 3d at 911-16, 592 P.2d at 348-51, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 861-64 (Richard-
son, J., dissenting).
127. See note 74 supra.
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opinion that expressly dealt with property rights. 12
The United States Supreme Court, interpreting the
United States Constitution, has declared that an owner of
a private shopping center "when adequate alternative av-
enues of communication exist" has a property right pro-
tected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments which is
superior to the First Amendment right of those who come
upon the shopping center premises for purposes unrelated
to the center. 129
Conceding that zoning regulations of private property are
valid when they bear a substantial relationship to public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare, the dissent charged
the court with zoning by judicial fiat. "The character of a free
speech claim cannot be transmuted into something else by
changing the label and invoking the police power."130
4. The Analysis
The Robins decision represents an assertion of states'
rights in the modern sense of federalism since the holding was
cast solely in terms of the California Constitution.81 The
court reaffirmed the original state law basis of its Diamond I
rationale despite contrary United States Supreme Court inter-
pretations of the underlying federal precedent. The California
court's narrow reading of Lloyd was contrary to an Oregon
state court interpretationas that had perceived federal prop-
erty rights of a constitutional nature in that case. Further-
more, the court's action required overruling itself a second
time on the same subject. The opinion relied upon state deci-
sions spanning many years to demonstrate the existence of alongstanding state policy embodying a preference for rights df
expression and petition and a consistent enunciation of the
128. Lloyd mentions property rights at 407 U.S. at 552-53, 567-69.
129. 23 Cal. 3d at 914, 592 P.2d at 350, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
130. Id. at 916, 592 P.2d at 351, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
131. "We conclude that sections 2 and 3 of article I of the California Constitu-
tion protect speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even
when the centers are privately owned." Id. at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at
860.
132. Lenrich Assocs. v. Heyda, 264 Or. 112, 504 P.2d 112 (1972). See also Note,Constitutional Law-Freedom of Speech-Owners' Fifth Amendment Property
Rights Prevent a State Constitution From Providing Broader Free Speech RightsThan Provided by the First Amendment.-Lenrich Associates v. Heyda, 504 P.2d
112 (Ore. 1972), 86 HARv. L. REv. 1592 (1973).
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validity of use restrictions on property in the name of the
public welfare.
One advantage of the Robins result is its accommodation
of individual interests-neither interest is absolute and
neither is totally excluded. Petitioners and speakers are sub-
ject to reasonable regulation, but they do have a right to
speak. Likewise, shopping center owners may not arbitrarily
exclude speakers, but may impose reasonable regulations on
expressive activities on their commercial property. This fair
accommodation allows both rights a circumscribed existence
by ensuring a viable public forum for petitioners' activities
while safeguarding business from disruptive interference.
Another positive aspect of the opinion is the court's reli-
ance on unique local conditions to give further substance to
its independent claim. Modern community life in California
may require a different balance than the same rights might
yield in another part of the nation. Recalling that federalism
was conceived as a solution to governing a large geographical
area with some common and some diverse interests, reliance
on the state constitution reasserts the ideas of pluralism, di-
versity, and experimentation that federation envisaged.
The main weakness of the opinion as a foundation for fu-
ture independent interpretation lies in its avoidance of the
state action issue."3 8 While mentioning that Lloyd's discussion
of property rights pertained only to the question of state ac-
tion, the majority opinion makes no effort to explain how it
arrived at that reading nor what significance it holds for inter-
pretation of the state constitution. The fourteenth amend-
ment requires state action184 and apparently none was found
in Lloyd since the United States Supreme Court did not re-
quire application of the first amendment in that case. But the
California Declaration of Rights does not require state action
to trigger the safeguarding of individual liberties. The lan-
133. See Horowitz and Karst, The California Supreme Court and State Action
Under the Fifth Amendment: The Leader Beclouds the Issue, 21 U.C.L.A. L. Rv.
1421 (1974) criticizing the California Supreme Court's handling of state action issues,
including the Diamond cases; Hagman, Furey v. City of Sacramento, 32 Land Use &
Zoning Digest 9 (Jan. 1980) which criticizes the California Supreme Court for "erratic
decision making" and opinions that are "sloppily done."
134. But see Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), where the United
States Supreme Court held that section five of the fourteenth amendment gives Con-
gress authority to pass legislation that reaches private conduct as long as the law
reasonably protects a right explicitly contained in the fourteenth amendment.
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guage of the sections which guarantee the rights of speech and
petition are phrased as affirmative grants to each person, not
as restrictions on the government as in the federal constitu-
tion. Thus, Robins fails to clearly assert the state's sovereign
right to regulate infringement of civil rights by private
conduct.'
Though Robins presented what had been analyzed in Di-
amond I as a right-versus-right controversy, the California
Supreme Court averted a direct confrontation of individual
rights by transmuting the conflict into two tandem instances
of right-versus-government controversy. Instead of constitu-
tionally protected expression pitted against constitutionally
protected property, the court recognized only one state consti-
tutional claim. Obviously, rights of expression are guaranteed
by both the federal and state constitutions. If federal court
interpretation of those rights does not require they be given
effect on privately owned shopping center property, the only
remaining constitutional issue is the scope of the rights of ex-
pression and petition under the state Declaration of Rights.
Thus, the inquiry was reduced to a right-versus-government
analysis.
Using a similar analysis for the property rights claim, the
court reasoned that if neither the federal nor state constitu-
tions require an inviolate right to exclude others from private
property, then there was no remaining constitutional issue.
The controversy became a right-versus-government situation.
Since the state has undisputed authority to regulate private
property in the public interest, the conclusion in favor of the
state was manifest.
The court then took those two separate right-versus-gov-
135. See Countryman, supra note 3, at 473: "All provisions of a Bill of Rights
need not be directed to or against the government. Some may also regulate private
conduct as does the thirteenth amendment to the United States Constitution."
Countryman noted that the proposed New York Constitution that was rejected
in 1969 had included a proscription of private discrimination. He went on to point
out: "Nor is there any apparent reason why the constitutional proscription should be
confined to private discrimination. Other rights which all constitutions guarantee
against the state-and particularly rights of belief, speech, and association-are as
vulnerable to infringement by 'private governments' and as deserving of protection."
Id. at 474.
Private governments were defined as concentrations of economic power. "So I
commend also to state constitutional conventions the task of attempting to preserve
our individual freedoms not merely against those governments we elect but also
against those governments we do not elect." Id.
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ernment conflicts and examined the effects of their interrela-
tionship. The resulting conclusion was that if the public inter-
est involves a preferred constitutional right, at least some
types of private property can validly be regulated to give
meaningful force to that right.
The effect of the recharacterization of the conflict should
have been to insulate the state expansion of expressive rights
from federal judicial review. Despite its apparent independent
state basis, the United States Supreme Court calendared Rob-
ins for reviews 6 and postponed consideration of jurisdictional
questions until the hearing on the merits.3 7
IV. THE EFFECT OF CALIFORNIA'S JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS
I believe the 'new federalism' means more than polite
genuflections to comity, more than a mere shift of the
work from one judicial pile to another. I believe it re-
quires a return of the state courts to judicial
preeminence.'
The California Supreme Court's split in Robins illustrates
the polarity that exists in judicial spheres concerning the
meaning of Lloyd, the propriety of state independent inter-
pretation, and the parameters of the rights of free speech, pe-
tition, and private property in modern society. These formida-
ble problems challenged the United States Supreme Court
when it decided Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins." 9
The mere calendaring of the case gave pause for specula-
tion that the Court would confirm the notion that a shopping
center owner's federally protected property rights include a
right to exclude the expressive activity of others. Acceptance
of the case signified rejection of adequate state grounds as a
basis for abstention. Under that doctrine, the United States
Supreme Court would not have jurisdiction unless there was a
need to correct an error relating to questions of federal law.
4 0
The postponement of jurisdictional arguments to coincide
136. 48 U.S.L.W. 3132 (U.S. Sept. 11, 1979) (No. 79-289).
137. 444 U.S. 949 (1980).
138. Daughtrey, supra note 3, at 739.
139. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980)
(spelling changed from Pruneyard to PruneYard at the Supreme Court level).
140. See note 28 supra.
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with on the merits, however, left open the possibility that the
Court could still be choosing between two strong positions it
has taken in the past.
The Burger Court has taken a solid states' rights stance
and has increased its deference to the state courts in recent
opinions.14 1 Current Justices have encouraged state court ac-
tivism or espoused the older view of states' rights. 142 At the
same time, the Burger Court has also shown a strong prefer-
ence for private property rights and has generally weakened
rights of free expression.4 s
The unanimous judgment in favor of Robins, pronounced
in the unlikely voice of Justice Rehnquist, is a surprising reso-
lution of the controversy. In essence, the Court affirmed both
of the California Supreme Court's right-versus-government
holdings. First, while the first amendment does not require
that expressive activities be allowed on shopping center prop-
erty, the federal constitution does not preclude a state consti-
tution from providing more expansive expressive rights within
the proscriptions of the fifth amendment takings clause and
without infringement upon any other federal constitutional
right. Second, California's requirement that shopping centers
must allow reasonable exercise of the rights of expression and
petition on their property does not amount to taking withoutjust compensation nor does it violate traditional due process
standards.
But in addition to these two issues, the Court allowed an-
other right-versus-right issue to be argued which provided the
Justices an opportunity to discuss possible limits on a state
141. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (holding that the additional
benefits of federal judicial review of federal habeas corpus petitions when the claim is
based upon admission of illegally obtained evidence and the defendant has been af-
forded an opportunity for a full hearing in state courts are outweighed by the costs);
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (striking down as unconstitu-
tional Congressional extension of the Fair Labor Standard Act's minimum wage and
maximum hour provisions to state public employees as a violation of the tenth
amendment); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (holding that federal courts
should defer to state courts concerning grant or denial of injunctive relief against
state criminal prosecutions).
142. See, e.g., Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96,121 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); Lego v. Twomen, 404 U.S. 477, 489(1972); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175 (1969); Cooper v. California, 386
U.S. 58, 62 (1967); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-52 (1961); Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 220 (1960). See also Brennan, supra note 22.
143. See Brennan, supra note 22, at 495-98; Howard, supra note 5, at 874; Dec-
laration of Rights, supra note 3, at 497.
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power to expand civil liberties. The Court allowed PruneYard
Shopping Center to assert its own first amendment rights and
ultimately held that, at least in this case, those rights were
not violated.1
4 4
The Court found that the PruneYard had an appeal of
right14 5 by construing a state constitutional provision as a
"statute" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. section 1257(2).
Since the California Supreme Court had rejected the
PruneYard's claim that their federal property rights had been
violated and had upheld the validity of a state law affecting
those rights, the United States Supreme Court found that all
the necessary elements of jurisdiction by appeal were met.
The opinion thus avoided independent and adequate state
grounds as a basis for depriving the Court of jurisdiction in
this matter.
The implication that the grant of jurisdiction holds for
independent interpretation is difficult to discern. The Court
did not find an error in the California Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of a federal question that required correction-they
affirmed the decision in total. Even more perplexing is the
fact that they did not base jurisdiction on the PruneYard's
first amendment claim, which was not decided below. Had the
Court based jurisdiction on this undecided federal question,
the potential danger to federally protected rights caused by
the Court's abstention would be palpable.1"6 This type of
analysis brings the viability of the adequate and independent
state grounds abstention theory into serious question.
Justice Rehnquist explained in a lengthy footnote that
the question of PruneYard's first amendment rights was at
least mentioned below, if not decided. Of particular interest is
the notation that the Court will recognize federal claims as
adequately presented "when the highest state court renders
an unexpected interpretation of state law or reverses its prior
interpretation."14 7 This statement may provide a new test for
cases in which a state court expands civil liberties. Since few
states have heretofore based such decisions on their own con-
stitutions, nearly all state-law-based decisions might qualify
as "unexpected."
144. 447 U.S. at 82-85.
145. Id. at 79-80; see note 27 supra for text of 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2).
146. See note 38 supra.
147. 447 U.S. at 85-87 n.9.
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The Court took this opportunity to quell the controversy
over the meaning of Lloyd.148 Part III of the opinion cloaks
Lloyd solely in the garb of a first amendment case. The Lloyd
court found that the Constitution did not create first amend-
ment rights on privately owned property. The distinguishing
factor between that case and PruneYard is the intervening
presence of a state created right of expression. The message to
other state courts and legislatures appears to be unanimous
Court approval for state expansion of civil liberties within
federal boundaries."
Next, the Court addressed PruneYard's unsuccessful fifth
amendment taking and due process claims. While reinforcing
its recent statement that the right to exclude others was "es-
sential" in the bundle of property rights,150 and that a literal
"taking" had indeed occurred, the opinion differentiated be-
tween literal takings and takings "in the constitutional
sense."' 1 Moreover, the test by which to judge a constitu-
tional taking is whether the regulation causes an individual to
bear more than his just share of public burdens. 52 Two of the
three factors set out by the Court for making this determina-
tion are financial considerations-economic impact and inter-
ference with investment-backed expectations. The third factor
is the character of the government action itself." Ultimately,
the Court unanimously held that the value and use of the
PruneYard's property would not be unreasonably impaired by
the requirements of the state constitutional provision.'"
Within this discussion, Justice Rehnquist made a state-
ment that elicited a cryptic one sentence dissent from Justice
148. Id. at 80-81.
149. Justice Marshall's concurrence goes one step further by stating, "I applaud
the court's decision, which is part of a very healthy trend of affording state constitu-
tional provisions a more expansive interpretation than this Court has given to the
Federal Constitution." Id. at 2046.
150. Id. at 82 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80
(1979)).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See generally Comment, Inverse Condemnation and the Alchemist's Les-
son: You Can't Turn Regulations Into Gold, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 169 (1981) for a
discussion of both courts' approaches to "taking" cases.
154. Only Justice Marshall discussed the state action issue and the quasi-public
nature of the shopping center property. It is apparent that the doctrine of functional
equivalency is still alive, at least for Justice Marshall who has defended the correct-
ness of the Logan Valley decision through two bitter dissents (both in Lloyd and
Hudgens) and in Prune Yard's exuberant concurrence.
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Blackmun: "Nor as a general proposition is the United States,
as opposed to the several States, possessed of a residual au-
thority that enables it to define 'property' in the first in-
stance." '155 In the future, we are likely to see this sentence
make an appearance in many different adversary con-
texts-concerning both tangible and intangible property.
PruneYard's due process argument was quickly dispelled
by the Court's reiteration of the "minimum scrutiny" stan-
dard for judicial review. The state regulation is not unreason-
able, arbitrary or capricious and is substantially related to a
legitimate governmental goal. Moreover, the federal constitu-
tion does not prohibit a state from deciding that public access
to shopping centers for expressive purposes is necessary even
where alternative sites are available.1
Thus, parts I-IV of the opinion garnered nine votes to af-
firm both the California Supreme Court's authority to render
such a decision and its underlying rationale and also to ex-
plain several of the Court's own misunderstood opinions. Jus-
tices Powell and White, however, did not join the Court's dis-
cussion of PruneYard's first amendment rights in Part V of
the opinion.
PruneYard claimed that a private property owner has a
"[f]irst [a]mendment right not to be forced by the State to
use his property as a forum for the speech of others. ' 1 7 The
Court rejected this argument because the public was not likely
to identify the property owner with the views expressed by
the speakers, the state does not dictate the message ex-
pressed, and the property owner can easily disavow any par-
ticular message.1 58
Justices Powell and White concurred but each wrote sep-
arately to stress that the first amendment holding was based
on this record.1 59 Justice White worried about potential abuse
via state exactions from shopping center owners to provide
public forums. Further, he pointed out that states are not re-
quired to allow first amendment activity on private shopping
center property.
Justice Powell's concurrence sets out all the limitations
155. 447 U.S. at 88-89.
156. Id. at 85 n.8.
157. Id. at 85.
158. Id. at 85-88.
159. Id. at 96-101 (Powell, White, JJ., concurring).
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on the Court's holding and hints at infirmities in the
PruneYard's arguments that might be overcome in another
case. Apparently, had PruneYard asserted disagreement with
Robins' message, shown patron hostility to the message,
proved impairment of the shopping center's business, or con-
tended that disavowal of the message was essential and too
onerous, the first amendment cause of action might have been
viable. 160 Of course, these suggestions are but illusory for
PruneYard. Since the Court allowed the first amendment is-
sue to be argued without a complete record, it hardly seems
fair to hinge an unfavorable decision on an inadequate record.
Nevertheless, the message for future property-owner litigants
is clear-make a complete record below showing interference
with business, unreasonable costs, or enforced repudiation and
the Court may take another look at the issue.
V. CONCLUSION
In a right-versus-right situation, it appears a state court
cannot insulate its decisions from review. On the other hand,
Prune Yard establishes even clearer precedent that the Su-
preme Court is in full agreement that state courts may engage
in independent interpretation. While the limits of this state
power have not been established, the Court has signaled state
courts to watch out for "constitutional takings," avoid uphold-
ing arbitrary and capricious regulations that are not substan-
tially related to the public interest, and be alert for other fed-
erally protected rights, including the right to remain silent.
The California Supreme Court should continue its trend-
setting practice of independently assessing state safeguards of
individual rights in both right-versus-government and right-
versus-right situations. Article I, section 24 is a state constitu-
tional mandate to do so. Even if the independent interpreta-
tion does not prevent Supreme Court review, both the courts
and litigants will be benefited.
The benefits of independent interpretation to the courts
are many. The prophecy role can be largely eliminated if state
courts consistently look to their own state law to determine its
applicability rather than guessing how another judicial body
might reason. Controversies could be resolved at the lowest
160. Id. at 97-101.
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level. Being closer to local conditions, state courts can provide
essential input to the Supreme Court and can experiment
with a variety of solutions implausible to attempt at the fed-
eral level. Furthermore, independent state solutions that
prove successful can serve as a foundation for nationwide ap-
plication should uniformity become necessary." 1 A well-rea-
soned state decision clarifies the issues for review and pro-
vides the myriad viewpoints of many legal minds that can
assure vitality in the law. Without independent interpretation
of state constitutions, state courts are in danger of abdicating
their responsibility to protect their citizens from abridgement
of liberties and from state governmental intrusions as well as
avoiding their duty to act as a check against federal govern-
ment intrusion on the rights of the states.162 In the quest for
uniformity within the federal system, it is important to avoid
the rigidity of so complete a centralization of the safeguarding
of civil liberties that the judiciary is no longer responsive to
modern society. As Justice Mosk has noted: "If the result is
fragmentation of a national consciousness, it is justified in fur-
therance of an expanded liberty."""
The advantage to litigants of independent interpretation
is that it can provide a well developed body of state constitu-
tional law which more clearly defines parameters and provides
predictability. Firmly based state opinions may obviate the
need for review in most cases, thus speeding up the legal pro-
cess and cutting costs of litigation.
In Prune Yard, the United States Supreme Court recog-
nized a more modern definition of the extent of protection
161. Justice Brandeis once pointed out the benefits of federalism: "[O]ne of the
happy incidents of the federal system is that a single courageous state may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 311
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See Meador, Some Yins and Yangs of Our Judicial
System, A.B.A.J., Feb. 1980, at 122.
162. See Countryman, supra note 3, who offers three reasons for strong state
bills of rights.
(1) Many of the Supreme Court's interpretations of federal constitu-
tional guarantees applicable to the states are not clearly acceptable to-
day, much less for the indefinite future. (2) Not all of the federal consti-
tutional guarantees have been held applicable to the states. (3) Modern
society is entitled to expect additional guarantees not to be found in the
Constitution of the United States.
Id. at 456.
163. Mosk, supra note 7, at 721.
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that can legitimately be afforded property rights in today's so-
ciety, as well as offering an opportunity to reaffirm the basic
ideals of federalism.
Independent interpretation can be a useful judicial tool in
filling the void left by the United States Supreme Court's re-
treat in the protection of basic individual liberties. The next
phase of constitutional analysis may well see the state courts
return to their original role as the predominant protectors of
the individual through well-reasoned analysis of their own
bills of rights.
Betty Ann Smith

